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STATES OF CONTINUITY OR STATE OF
EXCEPTION? RACE, LAW AND POLITICS
IN THE AGE OF TRUMP
Devon W. Carbado*
This Essay introduces the concept of “states of continuity” to
caution against an uncritical framing of constitutional law and
political developments in the age of Trump/Trumpism as a “state
of exception.”1 I invoke the expression state of exception to stand
in for the argument on the left that the Trump era will produce a
set of constitutional and political arrangements that materially
depart from the constitutional and political frameworks that
preceded it. Students of Agamben will note one difficulty with this
claim: As a general matter, proponents of Trumpism do not justify
their policy initiatives solely on the ground that we exist in a state
of exception. They frame those initiatives, instead, as part of a
broader project to “Make America Great Again.”2 To put all of
this another way, whereas Agamben conceived of the state of
exception as a moment in which the sovereign naturalizes
extraordinary measures that subsequently become ordinary
features of governance,3 political actors in the Trump era achieve
their social and political goals often (though certainly not always)

* For comments on or conversations about this Essay, I thank Tendayi Achiume,
Asli Bâli, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Cheryl Harris, Luke Harris, Daniel HoSang, George
Lipsitz, Joseph Lowndes, K-Sue Park, Christopher Petrella, and Jothie Rajah. Alison
Korgan provided terrific research assistance. All errors are my own.
1. For a particular framing of the state of exception, see generally GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005).
2. See About the 45th President of the United States Donald J. Trump,
DONALDJTRUMP.COM, http://www.donaldjtrump.com/about/, (last visited November 18,
2018) (quoting President Trump and his campaign promise, “We will make America strong
again. We will make America proud again. We will make America safe again. And we will
Make America Great Again!”); See also, Lynn Vavreck, Trump’s Approach Is More Like
Reagan’s Than You Might Think, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/B73CVUZF; Nell Irvin Painter, Opinion, What Whiteness Means in the Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2016, at SR4.
3. See AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 1, at 16.
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through a disavowal of the exceptionality of their measures.4 The
end result is that while in the world Agamben describes the state
of exception is legitimized through recourses to a discourse of
exigency, in the world of Trump/Trumpism the interventions are
legitimized through recourses to discourses of ordinariness and
return.
Though it might be fair to say that Agamben’s account of the
“state of exception” obscures the degree to which there are always
already people for whom the state of exception is an “ordinary”
feature of social life, it strikes me as both important and
productive to conceptualize and articulate Trump/Trumpism
through the prism of exceptionalism.5 At the same time, I worry
that the exceptionalism frame has the potential to effectuate too
sharp a rupture between a “then”—the political and
constitutional moment before Donald J. Trump became President
of the United States—and a “now”—the current
Trump/Trumpism moment in which we find ourselves. This Essay
elaborates on what I mean, drawing on the concept of “states of
continuity” to do so.
***
My starting point is to note that a state of exception
understanding of Trump/Trumpism can easily elide the various

4. See Erica L. Green, Matt Apuzzo, & Katie Benner, Trump Officials Reverse
Obama’s Policy on Affirmative Action in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2018, at
A1(recounting members of the Trump administration’s response to the reversal of Obamaera affirmative action policies. A joint letter between the Education and the Justice
Departments denounced the Obama-era policies as “beyond the requirements of the
Constitution.” Secretary of Education DeVos wrote, “The Supreme Court has determined
what affirmative action policies are constitutional, and the court’s written decisions are the
best guide for navigating this complex issue.” And a senior Justice Department official
further emphasized that “they were… hewing the department closer to the letter of the
law”); See also Jaweed Kaleem, Trump Administration Rescinds Obama-Era Policies
Encouraging Affirmative Action and Backs Race-Neutral School Admissions, L.A. TIMES,
(July 3, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-affirmative-action20180703-story.html.
5. Walter Benjamin might have been getting at something like the foregoing idea
when he suggested that “the state of emergency” that historically has frightened the
metropole has been the normal state of existence for much of the world. See WALTER
BENJAMIN, ON THE CONCEPT OF HISTORY (1942); Giorgio Agamben, The State of
Emergency, in CENTRE ROLAND-BARTHES (2002). Aimé Césaire advanced a similar
observation, noting that while Europe was surprised by Hitler, Asia, Africa, and Latin
America were not. See AIM. . . C. . .SAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (Joan Pinkham
trans., 2001).
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conservative projects, and centrist ideological commitments, that
created conditions of possibility for Trump/Trumpism. Indeed, to
some extent, Trump/Trumpism is the conservative and middle-ofthe-road liberal chicken coming home to roost. This is certainly
true with respect to what one might broadly call the constitutional
law of race.
Critical Race Theorists in particular have long demonstrated
the multiple ways in which the Supreme Court has, for some time,
effectively constitutionalized racial inequality.6 That things could
get worse—and a lot worse—under Trump/Trumpism should not
obscure the edifice of constitutional law that preceded the Trump
regime. This body of law all but ensures the continued
marginalization of people of color. I am thinking here about
everything from employment discrimination,7 to voting rights,8 to
policing,9 to the war on terrorism,10 to access to the courts,11 to
immigration regulation and enforcement,12 to affirmative action,13
to mass incarceration and the death penalty.14 Across the
foregoing domains of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has
narrowed the scope of constitutional rights, increased the barriers
to litigating those rights, and diminished the penalties and
remedies when government officials violate them.15 Thus, even
6. See Elise Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016); Robin
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 803 (2004); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique Of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Ian
Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012); Cheryl Harris, Equal
Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1753 (2001); Cheryl
Harris, Limiting Equality: The Divergence and Convergence of Title VII and Equal
Protection, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2014); Darren Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories:
In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187 (2004); Devon W. Carbado, Constitutionalizing
Inequality (draft on file with author).
7. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
8. See, e.g., Shelby Country v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
9. See, e.g, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
10. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Amna Akbar, National Security’s
Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 833 (2015); Amna Akbar, Policing Radicalization, 3
UC IRVINE L. REV. 809 (2013); Khaled Beydoun, America, Islam, and Constitutionalism:
Muslim American Poverty and the Mounting Police State, 31 J. L. & RELIGION 279 (2017).
11. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
13. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
15. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW
YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017).
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were the Supreme Court never to decide another case, the scales
of constitutional law are already tipped heavily in favor of
maintaining and entrenching rather than ameliorating and
disrupting racial inequality. Am I suggesting, therefore, that
nothing is at stake in this moment? No. I am simply urging that
we ought to take care to note what I will call “states of continuity.”
By “states of continuity” I mean instances in which systems
and technologies of power—ideologies, discursive frames, and
practices—are continuous across, for example, different historical
periods, different national and geographic boundaries, different
public and private spaces, different legal and political contexts,
different political parties, and different social categories.16 When
Michelle Alexander speaks of the “New Jim Crow,” something
akin to states of continuity (vis-à-vis the “Old Jim Crow”) is
plausibly implicated.17 Douglas Blackmon’s account of how
slavery functioned “by another name” after the formal abolition
of the institution is arguably an example of states of continuity.18
Cheryl Harris’s contention that whiteness has functioned “as
property” across different doctrinal regimes in the United States
could be framed as a story about states of continuity.19 States of
continuity might also be at play in Edward Said’s conception of
Orientalism, a phenomenon that according to Said travels across
different articulations and instantiations of the “European
Western Experience.”20 Malcolm X’s suggestion that “racism is
like a Cadillac, they bring out a new model every year”21 is
simpatico with what I am calling states of continuity. Similarly,
Achille Mbembe’s observation that the violence and death of
Nazism was “the extension to the ‘civilized’ peoples of Europe
methods previously reserved for ‘savages’”22 could be understood
as a claim about states of continuity. When Kimberlé Crenshaw
16. The foregoing is not intended as an exhaustive list.
17. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
18. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLS WAR II (1998)
19. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
20. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIENT
(1997).
21. Malcolm X, who worked for a short time as an assembly-line worker in a truck
factory in Detroit, would articulate that line to his followers. See GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE
POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY
POLITICS 183 (2006).
22. Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUBLIC CULTURE 11 (2003).
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asserts that a reform/retrenchment dialectic has marked the
trajectory of black civil rights,23 she is arguably foregrounding an
example of states of continuity. Finally, K-Sue Park’s argument
that the United States has long been a “self-deportation” nation
in which the government has employed “one common logic” to
facilitate a range of self-deportation strategies to control and
discipline “the migration of undesired populations” reflects
precisely the kind of engagements and contestations—within and
across the boundaries of history, legal frameworks, political
parties, and social categories—that enables one to see the various
mechanisms through and on which states of continuity are
potentially effectuated.24
To describe states of continuity in the way that I have is to
suggest neither the precise and inevitable reproduction of that
which has come before nor the exact manifestation of particular
systems or technologies of power across two or more domains.25 I
am not speaking here of uniformity or something analogous to
“perfect continuity.” Context—in its most capacious sense—will
always matter and shape where and how power travels and
expresses itself. Accordingly, I should be clear to note that the
concept of states of continuity I have in mind presupposes
moments of rupture and divergence, or what we might think of as
“states of discontinuity.”
Nor am I arguing that there is a totalizing way in which states
of continutity function. The kinds of continuities one might
analyze across political party affiliation, social categories, and
geography will not necessarily map onto the kinds of continuities
one might analyze across time and institutions. Undoubtedly,
there are (and will always be) important differences with respect
to how states of continuity operate, the precise contours of which
cannot be expressed through the level of abstraction at which I
23. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988)
24. K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
25. To say, for example, that racism is a continuous phenomenon is to say neither
that its impacts are the same across racial groups nor that each of the racial groups is
equally positioned to mobilize the various technologies through which racism is expressed.
In this respect, my conception of states of continuity reflects the kind of political and
intellectual sensibility that underwrites Joe Lowndes’s and Daniel HoSang’s notion of
“racial transposition,” a theory that seeks to map how race and racial meanings travel and
circulate. See generally DANIEL HOSANG & JOSEPH LOWNDES, PRODUCERS, PARASITES
AND PATRIOTS: RACE AND THE NEW RIGHT-WING POLITICS OF PRECARITY
(forthcoming 2019).
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have introduced the theory.26 At bottom, I am trying to engender
a sensiblity—a way of thinking and seeing—that presses up
against and resists acquiescing to the boundaries of various forms
of compartmentalism—the public/private; the past/present; the
Republican/Democrat; the national/global, and so on. Finally, I
should stress again my view that the theory of states of continuity
I am propounding is not a wholesale repudiation of the theory of
the state of exception Agamben seemed to have in mind.27 I offer
states of continuity as a provisional concept to put into sharp relief
what claims about the state of exception sometimes elide—the
continuous nature of regimes and technologies of power. In at
least one sense, the elision of this dynamic of continuity in
arguments about the state of exception is curious: Agamben’s
articulation of the state of exception is itself an example of states
of continuity—that is to say, an example of the degree to which
across time, national boundaries, political parties, and ideological
commitments the availability and mobilization of the state of
exception has functioned as a crucial technology of power through
which people are reduced to “bare life.”
To return more specifically to Trump/Trumpism: To say that
there are continuous dimensions to Trump/Trumpism is not to
turn a blind eye to the exceptional features of this political
moment. One might reasonably argue that the expansive view of
the Executive under Trump/Trumpism, the warehousing of
children in cages in detention centers, and the proliferation of tent
camps along the border are salient markers of the state of
exception at work. I do not mean to quarrel with those accounts.
My modest intervention is to suggest that those arguments should
not overdetermine how we think about Trump/Trumpism lest we
lose sight of the “normal” and more “respectable” conservative

26. I leave to others the challenge of articulating what those differences might look
like.
27. There are other reasons one might challenge various articulations of the state of
exception, including the extent to which scholars sometimes mobilize the theory without
attending to race, class, sexuality, and other socially marginilized subject positions (for
example, one’s position as an immigrant or as an incarcerated person). For critiques of
Agamben’s work along these lines, see Mark Rifkin, Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking
Sovereignty in Light of the “Peculiar” Status of Native Peoples, 73 CULTURAL CRITIQUE
88 (2009); FALGUNI SHETH, TOWARDS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RACE (2009);
Ladelle McWhorther, Post-Structuralism and Race: Giorgio Agamben and Michel
Foucault, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF RACE 113 (Taylor et al
ed.itors).
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projects through and on which (even the most exceptional
dimensions of) Trump/Trumpism came into being.
Though my view is that the racial dimensions of
Trump/Trumpism have their predicate precisely in those more
“normal” and “respectable” articulations of conservative
politics—and in centrist formulations of liberal racial
commitments—it is beyond the scope of this Essay to articulate
the full contours of those continuities. But a brief discussion of a
particular left/right state of continuity might be hepful. The
example I have in mind has, for over forty years, functioned as
one of the most hotly contested social policy questions in the
Unites States—affirmative action.
***
Notwithstanding ongoing controversies over affirmative
action, the policy, paradoxically, has been an arena in which not
only pre-Trump and post-Trump conservatives ideologically
converge but also where many liberals and conservatives
ideologically converge. Across the ideological spectrum, people
conceptualize affirmative action as a racial preference that we
should treat suspiciously and rarely, if ever, use. Indeed, as
Kimberlé Crenshaw has noted, for the most part, the difference
between liberal and conservative views on affirmative action is
that while liberals think the preference is justified because the
policy advances diversity, conservatives think the policy is never
justified because it instantiates reverse discrimination.28 This state
of continuity between the left and the right on affirmative action
provides at least a partial explanation for why Californians—who
so ardently position themselves against Donald Trump—passed
Proposition 209, an anti-affirmative action measure that traded on
the idea that affirmative action undermines core American values
(like merit and hard work) and harms innocent whites.29

28. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY (1995);
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
123 (2007); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructing a Pro-Active Defense
of Affirmative Action, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 196 (2000).
29. See CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 31, reprinted in APPENDIX A. The initiative is also
known as Proposition 209, or the “California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI).” For an
analysis of the liberal roots of all of California’s racialized ballot measures dating back to
the 1940s, see DANIEL HOSANG, RACIAL PROPOSITIONS: BALLOT INITIATIVES AND THE
MAKING OF POSTWAR CALIFORNIA (2010).
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Political scientist Luke Harris and philosopher Uma Narayan
have provided perhaps the most compelling account of the degree
to which liberals have acquiesced in the preference framing of
affirmative action.30 That acquiescence is precisely what marks the
state of continuity about which I have been speaking. It is not my
aim in this Essay to explain why conservatives and liberals align
on the preference framing of affirmative action. I am interested,
instead, in encouraging liberals to opt out of that state of
continuity.
That I employ the language of opting out does not rest on the
view that states of continuity can always be escaped. In some
instances, the relevant system or technology of power might be,
to borrow from Daria Roithmayr, fundamentally “locked in.”31
Think, for example, about racism and American democracy. One
could argue that the state of continuity of racism across different
moments in American history is an essential feature of American
democracy. Under this view, while it absolutely true to say that
American democracy has, in some moments, evidenced an
oppositional relationship to racism, it is true as well that
American democracy has also (and perhaps always) been a
vehicle through which racism has been expressed.32 Understood
in this way, it might make little sense to speak in terms of ending
or escaping the state of continuity between American democracy
and racism (since the latter has been a core and foundational
feature of the former) and speak instead in terms of mitigating
that relationship.
With respect to affirmative action, this Essay presses the
language of elimination, not mitigation, at least as a thought
experiment. My view is that liberals can effectuate a rupture
between themselves and conservatives by articulating affirmative
action as a countermeasure rather than a preference. This

30. See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action
Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. (1994).
31. See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES
LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The
Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 31 (2003).
32. Thus, for example, Derrick Bell’s claim that racism is endemic to American
society. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993). That argument is one of the central claims in Critical
Race Theory. See Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593 (2011).
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possibility exists because, as I have explained elsewhere,33 the
preference framing of affirmative action trades on several
normatively and empirically contingent assumptions.34 Suppose,
for example, that one thought that conventional admissions
practices reflect a simplistic understanding of race and racism and
failed to grapple with not only radical conceptions of racial
inequality—such as racial capitalism35—but relatively modest
ones, like implicit biases and stereotype threat. From that vantage
point, one is more likely to view affirmative action as a
countermeasure that offsets racial disadvantages than as a social
policy that produces them.36
Disrupting the state of continuity between liberals and
conservatives on the issue of affirmative action is important for a
number of reasons. First, immediately after the election, some
liberals (and not just conservatives) began circulating essentially
a blame-the-victim narrative to explain Donald Trump’s
presidential win: identity politics.37 Their claim, more precisely, is
that the Democratic Party’s over investment in identity politics,
particularly race, caused the Democrats to lose the election.38 This
33. See Devon Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of
African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 174 (2016).
See also Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43: Recovering Justice Powell’s Anti-Preference
Framing of Affirmative, U.C. DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2019).
34. Still, I recognize that one could argue that the perception that any racial
remediation for African Americans is a preference might be so baked into our national
consciousness that black assertions of civil rights claims will almost always be framed as
“special rights.” See Mario Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967
(2010) (discussing the extent to the Supreme Court viewed in the late 1800s viewed civil
rights legislations as “special rights”).
35. BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION.
(London: Zed Books, 1983) [Republished by UNC Press, 2000, with a new preface and a
foreword by Robin D.G. Kelley].
36. Carbado et al., supra note 34 (discussing these concepts).
37. See, e.g., Mark Lilla, Opinion, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2016, at SR1; Adam Gopnik, The Democrats and the Seesaw of Identity Politics, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-democratsand-the-seesaw-of-identity-politics.
38. See Steve Koppman, Opinion, How Identity Politics Hurts Democrats’ National
Hopes,
MERCURY
NEWS
(March
10,
2018,
8:45
AM),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/03/10/opinion-how-identity-politics-hurts-democratsnational-hopes/; Jason L. Riley, A Critique of Identity Politics—From Obama, WALL ST.
J. (July 24, 2018, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-critique-of-identitypoliticsfrom-obama-1532473677; Ed Rogers, Opinion, The Democrats’ Use of the Race
Card Does Real Harm, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-partisan/wp/2017/11/01/the-democrats-use-of-the-race-card-does-real-harm/
?utm_term=.14268a3f7dd2. But see Ian Haney Lopez and Anat Shenker-Osorio, The
Answer to GOP Dog Whistles? Democrats Should Talk More About Race, Not Less,
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racially specific diagnosis of the outcome of the election carried
with it a racially specific “colorblind”39 prescription: Going
forward, Democrats should talk less about race and race
conscious policies, particularly affirmative action, and talk more
about class and economic anxieties, particularly with reference to
the white working class.40
Two points bear emphasis. First, the liberal “colorblind”
injunction to the left aligns almost perfectly with the normative
terms on which conservatives contest affirmative action—namely,
that the policy is divisive and undermines the principle of
WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-answer-togop-dog-whistles-democrats-should-talk-more-about-race-not-less/2018/08/22/7cfa4d3aa184-11e8-8e87 c869fe70a721_story.html?utm_term=.a663054378f1. To some extent, the
focus on identity politics in the elections is a part of a broader claim scholars sometimes
advance about backlash politics. See JOSEPH LOWNDES, FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE
NEW RIGHT: RACE AND THE SOUTHERN ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (2008).
39. See Devon W. Carbado, Why We Should Always Put “Colorblind” in Scare
Quotes (draft on file with author).
40. See David Atkins, It Was Prejudice. It Was Economics. It was Both, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT (July 7, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/it-was-prejudice-it-waseconomics-it-was-both; Democrats Will Struggle to Win Back Obama-Trump Voters, THE
ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/11/02/
democrats-will-struggle-to-win-back-obama-trump-voters; Ruy Teixeira, The Math Is
Clear: Democrats Need to Win More Working-Class White Votes, VOX (Jan. 29, 2019 11:20
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/1/29/16945106/democrats-white-workingclass-demographics-alabama-clinton-obama-base. What’s particularly frustrating about
the thesis that white working class resentment at identity politics propelled white working
class people to vote for Donald Trump is that it obscures a point about race and voting
that reveals a white racial advantage. There has been no voter suppression or
gerrymandering efforts to dilute the white working class vote. Nor has felony
disenfranchisement been deployed as mechanism to diminish the voting opportunities of
white working class Americans. I am not saying that white working class Americans are
unaffected by voter suppression regimes and felony disenfranchisement. The point is
rather that the white working class are not the intended targets of those policies. The end
result is that working class whites get to vote—and vote their racial resentment—while
African-American access to the franchise continues to be racially circumscribed. For a
discussion of the extent of the voter suppression problem and the range of tactics that were
employed, see ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT (2016). A final point worth
mentioning about the white working class is whether it is fair to attribute the outcome of
the election to that group. More white women, for example, voted for Donald Trump than
voted for Hilary Clinton. See Katie Rogers, White Women Helped Elect Donald Trump,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/politics/white-womenhelped-elect-donald-trump.html. More white men voted for Donald Trump than for Hilary
Clinton; in short, more white people voted for Donald Trump than they did for Hilary
Clinton. See Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race,
Gender, Education, PEW RES. CTR (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/. To frame the
outcome of the election in terms of white working class Americans—rather than white
Americans writ large—is to obscure the role that whiteness qua whiteness continues to
play in our electoral politics.
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colorblindness. Second, while the intra-left critique of the
elections fashions itself as a race neutral alternative to leftoriented identity politics, the solution the critique proffers
expressly calls for Democrats to pay attention to a particular
racial group: white working-class Americans. In this regard, the
proposed solution is a striking example of how the racial
consciousness of a policy or political strategy can be disappeared
when its intended beneficiaries are white.41 Re-described, the
anti-identity injunction of some liberals is less a call for
Democrats to avoid race and more a call that they racially target
and engage a subgroup of white Americans (again, the white
working class) via a form of identity politics that we might call
white identity politics.42 Cheryl Harris refers to racial strategies of
this sort—the simultaneous reliance and disavowal of identity—
as “anti-identity identity” politics.43
The liberal move to rely on and disavow race in the context
of making sense of the elections produced both race and class
effects. More precisely, the move naturalized whiteness as the
identity through which working class status acquires social
intelligibility and naturalized blackness and non-whiteness more
generally as racial identities through which working class status is
refused. Put differently, the liberal identity-based explanations
for the elections denaturalized whiteness as a potential predicate
for identity politics and denaturalized blackness as a racial
identity through which working class experiences are lived. Noah
Zatz’s compelling race and class analysis of the elections
articulates a version of this point:
[D]rawing conclusions about class from data about white
people ignores working class people of color and consigns
them to pure “race” voters. It reproduces a racially unmarked
but implicitly white concept of the working class, one that is
especially problematic against the backdrop of racially
41. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 1139 (2008) (discussing the ways in which anti-affirmative action initiatives function
as racial preferences).
42. A political iteration of Cheryl I. Harris’s theory of whiteness as property and
George Lipsitz’s theory of a possessive investment in whiteness are at play here. See
GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (2006); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
43. See Cheryl I. Harris, Doubting Thomas and the Anti-Identity Identity
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (describing Justice Clarence Thomas’s
jurisprudence as a n example of anti-identity politics).
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stratified stereotypes of who is and is not “hard working.”
Using, as has become common, the racially qualified
term
“white working class” is an improvement, but too often it goes
without an accompanying analysis of how whiteness shapes
class among white people nor how class matters to people of
color.44

The problem here, then, is not only that the category “white
working class” has representative currency both in the particular
(as white working class) and in the general (as working class per
se), but that that currency is achieved by displacing non-white
working class identities and by positioning whiteness outside of
and beyond identity politics.
Which brings me to another reason the anti-identity
explanation for Trump’s victory is troubling. It ignores more
obvious causal candidates for Trump’s ascendancy to the White
House and affirms a standard conservative line about race. These
other candidates include race-baiting and xenophobia, sexism and
misogyny, voter suppression, electoral meddling, and a
compromised Democratic candidate.45 In downplaying these
44. Noah Zatz, Thinking Intersectionally About Race and Class in the Trump Era, L.
& POL. ECON. (Nov. 13, 2017), lpeblog.org.
45. See OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, ASSESSING
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (Jan. 6, 2017); G.
Reginald Daniel & Jasmine Kelekay, Seeking Justice Through Love and Relationships:
From Loving v. Virginia to Barack Obama: The Symbolic Tie That Binds, 50 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 641 (2017); Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 629 (2018); Gary C. Jacobson, Polarization, Gridlock, and
Presidential Campaign Politics in 2016, 667 ANNALS 226 (2016); Erin A. Penrod,
Disenfranchisement 2.0: Recent Voter ID Laws and the Implications Thereof, 14 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 207 (2018); Abigail Perdue, Man Up or Go Home: Exploring Perceptions of
Women in Leadership, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1233 (2017); Juan F. Perea, Making Room For
More: Echoes of Slavery II: How Slavery’s Legacy Distorts Democracy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1081 (2018); Lindsay Perez Huber, “Make America Great Again!”: Donald Trump,
Racist Nativism and the Virulent Adherence to White Supremacy Amid U.S. Demographic
Change, 10 CHARLESTON L. REV. 215 (2016); Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual”
Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law, 19
CHI. J. INT’L L. 30 (2018); Terry Smith, White Backlash in a Brown Country, 50 VAL. L.
REV. 89 (2015); Alice Woolley & Elysa Darling, Nasty Women and the Rule of Law, 51 S.
FLA. L. REV. 507 (2017); Nina Burleigh, The Presidential Election Was a Referendum on
Gender and Women Lost, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 14, 2016 8:00AM), http://www.newsweek.com
/2016/11/18/hillary-clinton-presidential-election-voter-gender-gap-520579.html;
Chris
Cillizza, Hillary Clinton Has a Baggage Problem, WASHINGTON POST (April 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/04/23/hillary-clintons-baggageproblem/?utm_term=.733ab28e42f2; Andy Greenberg, Everything We Know About
Russia’s Election-Hacking Playbook, WIRED (June 9, 2017), perma.cc/UU3W-NUGV;
Jonathan Mahler, Donald Trump’s Message Resonates with White Supremacists, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/us/politics/donald-trump-
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explanations and highlighting identity politics, liberals are
endorsing a version of the conservative argument that engaging
race in the political or legal arena—for whatever reason—is
pernicious, dangerous, and balkanizing.46
Let’s now focus on a second set of concerns that reveal why
exposing and contesting the state of continuity between liberals
and conservatives with respect to their views on affirmative action
is important. We are at the beginning of another wave of
affirmative action litigation. Both Harvard and the University of
North Carolina are being sued.47 While the formal constitutional
terms on which this litigation will be staged is largely set,48 the
public discourse terms are not carved in stone. This gives liberals
some space to engage in efforts to reframe affirmative action. I
am not saying this would be an easy task. On the contrary, any
attempt at reframing would undoubtedly be an uphill battle. But
that battle could start ideologically at home, among and between
supremacists.html; Rex Murphy, It Wasn’t Misogyny that Caused Clinton’s Downfall, It
Was All the Baggage She Dragged Around, NAT’L POST (Nov. 11, 2016),
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/rex-murphy-fear-and-loathing-on-thecampaign-trail-16; Vann R. Newkirk II, How Voter ID Laws Discriminate, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-voter-id-lawsdiscriminate-study/517218/; David Remnick, Hillary Clinton Looks Back in Anger, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/25/hillaryclinton-looks-back-in-anger; Press Release, White House, Statement by the President on
Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29,
2016), https://perma.cc/3XXD-8K5C.
46. Scholars have described this ideology as it is manifested in Supreme Court
decision-making as the anti-balkanization thesis. See Darren Leonard Hutchinson,
Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique of the New Equal
Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE
L.J. 1278 (2010).
47. See Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Backs Suit Accusing Harvard of Discriminating
TIMES
(Aug.
30,
2018),
Against
Asian-American
Applicants,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/politics/asian-students-affirmative-actionharvard.html; Carolyn Ebeling, Lawsuit Calls UNC Admission Practices Unfair, THE
DAILY TAR HEEL (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2014/11/lawsuitcalls-unc-admissions-practices-unfair; Jane Stancill, UNC Has Spent $16.8 Million on
Affirmative Action Lawsuit, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.news
observer.com/news/local/article216485240.html. Moreover, the Department of Justice is
investigating Yale. See Brett Samuels, DOJ, Education Depart Launch Investigation into
Yale over alleged admissions discrimination, HILL (Sept. 26, 2018 1:26 PM),
https://thehill.com/regulation/408540-doj-education-dept-launch-investigation-into-yaleover-alleged-admissions. There is every reason to believe that other lawsuits will be
forthcoming.
48. The constitutional question will be whether affirmative action survives “strict
scrutiny.” See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2198 (2016).
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liberals. And, that minimalist step could mark the beginning of
the end of this left/right state of continuity, the beginning of the
end of the convergence between the liberal tepid support of
affirmative
action
(“we
support
affirmative
action
notwithstanding that it is a racial preference because we believe in
diversity”) and the conservative vigorous repudiation of the
policy (“we oppose the affirmative action because it is a racial
preference that is divisive and harms innocent whites”).
The third reason disrupting the state of continuity between
liberals and conservatives on affirmative action is important is
that “affirmative action is a harbinger for racial remediation writ
large.”49 Stated differently, what happens to affirmative action
happens to other forms of racial remediation. This is because “the
Supreme Court works out its ideological and normative views
about race in the affirmative action context and then exports
those ideas to other domains of constitutional law.”50 Scholars
have paid scant attention to this “miner’s canary” dimension of
affirmative action jurisprudence.51 Thus, they have not considered
how “affirmative action functions as a kind of diagnostic tool or
predictive index for the trajectory of racial remediation more
generally.”52 Nor have scholars noted the degree to which “the
conservative logics of affirmative action cases have metastasized
across multiple areas of constitutional law to limit and undermine
various forms of racial remediation.”53 As it turns out, it is not just
the rationales underlying the affirmative cases that travel but the
cases themselves. One sees, for example, the Court citing to
affirmative action jurisprudence in cases that implicate voting
rights, employment discrimination claims,54 and K-12
desegregation.55
I reference the preceding citational practices not just as a
push-back against liberals who grudgingly defend affirmative
49. See Devon W. Carbado, States of Continuity II: How The Supreme Court Deploys
Affirmative Action to Limit Other Forms of Racial Remediation (draft on file with author)
50. Id.
51. For an argument about how race can function as a miner canary for other forms
of social inequality, see LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY
(2003).
52. See Carbado, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. Noah Zatz has already drawn out some of the work affirmative action performs
in the employment discrimination context. See Noah Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere,
Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1155 (2015).
55. Parents Involved in Cmt. Sch. Dist. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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action because they view the policy largely the way conservatives
do. I do so as well as a push back against those on the left who
have sometimes been too quick to give up on affirmative action
on the view that the policy is too modest. This latter group of
liberals have failed to realize that it precisely because of the
radicalizing potential of affirmative action—both the policy itself
and what its constitutional status portends for other sites of racial
remediation—that conservatives on and off the Court view
affirmative action, and the rationales that underlie it, as an
ideological target of opportunity. On this view, one can expect
Trump and his supporters to trade on discursive frames
conservatives deploy to challenge affirmative action (for example,
the language of “merit”) to advance and legitimize various
conservative policy and legal initiatives (for example, “meritbased immigration”).56
***

My aim is this Essay was somewhat narrow: to suggest that
we exercise care with respect to when and how we frame
Trump/Trumpism as a state of exception. I introduced the concept
of states of continutity as another way of making sense of our
current political movement and the constitutional regimes it may
effectuate. To illustrate a state of continuity at work, I employed
the example of affirmative action and argued that, by and large,
both the right and the left conceptualize the policy as a
preference. I explained why the preference framing of affirmative
action is normatively and empirically contingent and suggested
the policy should be understood as a countermeasure to offset
particular racial disadvantages admissions practices generally do
not engage. My hope is that the reframing of affirmative action I
have offered will help to disrupt the state of continuity between
liberals and conservatives on the policy. That disruption, in turn,
could help to make affirmaive action and other racial remediation
projects less vulnerable to attack.

56. See Deena Flinchum, A Merit-Based Immigration System Would Help
Americans—and Skilled Foreigners, HILL (Nov. 29, 2017 8:15 AM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/362227-a-merit-basedimmigration-system-would-help-americans; William A. Galston, The Case for Merit-Based
Immigration, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2018 7:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-casefor-merit-based-immigration-1517963380.

